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Abstract
In this paper, a logic for reasoning about cooperation, ac-
tions and preferences of agents is developed. It is shown to
be sound and complete and the satisﬁability problem of its
fragment that does not contain strict preferences is shown
to be NExpTime-complete.
1. Introduction
When analyzing interactive situations involving multiple
agents, we are interested in what results agents can achieve
– individually or together as groups. In many cases, agents
can have various plans for achieving some result. These
plans can differ signiﬁcantly, e.g. with respect to their fea-
sibility, costs or side-effects. Hence, it is not only relevant
which results groups of agents can achieve but also how
exactly they can do so. In other words, plans and actions
also play a central role in interactive processes. Coopera-
tive ability of agents expressed only in terms of results and
actions that lead to these results does not tell us why agents
would actually decide to achieve a certain result. We also
need to take into account the preferences based on which
the agents decide what to do.
Summarizing, we can say that in interactive situations,
the following three questions are of interest and moreover
tightly connected:
 What results can groups of agents achieve?
 How can they achieve something?
 Why would they want to achieve a certain result?
The above considerations show that coalitional power, ac-
tions and preferences play a major role in interactive situ-
ations and are moreover tightly connected. Thus, a formal
theory for reasoning about agents’ cooperative abilities in
an explicit way should also take into account actions/plans
of agents and their preferences.
In logic, these aspects have mostly been addressed
separately. Coalitional power has mainly been investigated
within the frameworks of ATL [4], Coalition Logic [12] and
their extensions. These logics focus on what results groups
can achieve and do not represent explicitly how exactly
results can be achieved. Recently, there have been some
attempts to develop logics for reasoning about coalitional
power that also take into account either agents’ preferences
or actions. One group of such logics looks at cooperation
from the perspective of cooperative games [1, 2]. Another
path that has been taken in order to make coalitional power
more explicit is to combine cooperation logics with action
logics [14, 6, 7].
In this paper, a logic for reasoning about cooperation,
actions and preferences (CLA+P) is developed, which is
obtained by combining the cooperation logic with actions
CLA [14] with a preference logic [15, 16]. Soundness and
completeness are shown and the logics expressivity and
computational complexity are investigated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives a brief overview of the cooperation logic with
actions CLA [14]. In Section 3, a cooperation logic with
actions and preferences (CLA+P) is developed and sound-
ness and completeness are shown. Also its expressivity is
discussed. Section 4 investigates the computational com-
plexity of CLA+P.
2. Cooperation Logic with Actions (CLA)
In this section, we brieﬂy present the cooperation logic
with actions (CLA) developed by Sauro et al. [14], which
will be extended in the next section by combining it with a
preference logic. The idea of CLA is to make coalitional
power explicit by expressing it in terms of the ability to
perform actions instead of expressing it directly in terms
of the ability to achieve certain results. CLA is a modular
modal logic, consisting of an environment module for
reasoning about actions and their effects, and an agents
module for reasoning about agents’ abilities to perform
actions. By combining both modules, a framework is
obtained in which cooperative ability can be made moreexplicit.
The environment, which at a later step will be populated by
agents, is modelled as a labelled transition system whose
edges are labeled with sets of atomic actions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Environment Model [14]] An environment
model is a set-labelled transition system
E = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;V i:
S is a set of states, Ac is a ﬁnite set of atomic actions, !A
S  S for each A  Ac and V is a propositional valuation.
!A is required to be serial for each A  Ac. /
Then a modal language is deﬁned with modalities of the
form [], for  being a propositional formula built from
atomic actions. The intended meaning of []' is that ev-
ery transition !A such that A   (using the satisfaction
relation of propositional logic) leads to a state that satisﬁes
'. Formally,
E;s  []' iff 8A  Ac;s0 2 S : if A 
 and s !A s0 then E;s0  ':
An environment logic E is developed, which is sound and
complete with respect to the class of environment models
[14]. It contains seriality axioms and the K axiom for each
modality [], for  being consistent. For the details, the
reader is referred to Sauro et al. [14]. The environment
logic, can then be used for reasoning about the effects of
concurrent actions.
Before agents are introduced into the environment, a sep-
arate agents module is developed for reasoning about the
ability of (groups of) agents to perform actions. Each agent
is assigned a set of atomic actions that he can perform and
a group is assigned the set of actions its members can per-
form.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Agents Model [14]] An agents model is a
triple hAg;Ac;acti, where Ag is a set of agents, Ac is a set
of atomic actions and act is a function act : Ag ! P(Ac)
such that
S
i2Ag act(i) = Ac. For G  Ag, act(G) := S
i2G act(i). /
We are not only interested in what atomic actions agents
can perform but also in their abilities to enforce more
complex actions. An agent laguage is developed with
expressions hhGii, meaning that the group G can force
that a concurrent action is performed that satisﬁes . This
means that G can perform some set of atomic actions such
that no matter what the other agents do, the resulting set of
actions satisﬁes .
hAg;Ac;acti  hhGii iff 9A  act(G) : 8B 
act(AgnG) : A[B  :
Then a cooperation logic for actions is developed, which is
very much in the style of Coalition Logic [12] – the main
difference being that it is concerned with the cooperative
ability to force actions.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Coalition Logic for Actions [14]] The
coalition logic for actions A is deﬁned to be the logic de-
rived from the following set of axioms.
1. hhGii>, for all G  Ag,
2. hhGii ! :hhAg n Gii:,
3. hhGii ! hhGii if `  !  in propositional logic,
4. hhGiia !
W
i2Ghhfigiia for all G  Ag and atomic
a 2 Ac,
5. (hhG1ii^hhG2ii) ! hhG1[G2ii(^), for G1\
G2 = ;,
6. (hhGii ^ hhGii) ! hhGii( ^ ) if  and  have
no common atomic actions,
7. hhGii:a ! hhGiia for atomic a 2 Ac,
8. hhGii !
W
fhhGii
V
	j	isasetofliteralssuchthat V
	 ! g.
The rule of inference is modus ponens. /
Axiom 5 says how groups can join forces. The coalition
logic for actions is sound and complete with respect to the
class of agents models [14].
Next, agents are introduced as actors into the environment.
This is done by combining the environment models with
the agents models. In the resulting models, the agents can
perform actions which then have the effect of changing the
current state of the environment.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Multi-agent System [14]] A multi-agent
system (MaS) is a tuple
M = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;V;Ag;acti;
where hS;Ac;(!)AAc;V i is an environment model and
hAc;Ag;acti an agents model. /
Now, we can reason about what states of affairs groups of
agents can achieve by performing certain actions. The cor-
responding language contains all expressions of the envi-
ronment logic and the cooperation logic for actions and ad-
ditionally expressions for saying that a group has the power
to achieve '.Deﬁnition 2.5 [Language for MaS [14]] The language for
multi-agent systems Lcla is generated by the following
grammar:
' ::= p ' ^ ' :' []' hhGii hhGii'
for G  Ac and  being an action expression. /
hhGii' means that G can force that the system moves into
a '-state, i.e. G can perform some set of actions such that
no matter what the other agents do, the system will move
into a '-state.
M;s  hhGii' iff 9A  act(G) such that 8B 
act(Ag n G);t 2 S : if s !A[B
t; then M;s  ':
The environment logic and the coalition logic for agents are
combined by adding two interaction axioms.
Deﬁnition 2.6 [Cooperation Logic with Actions [14]] The
cooperation logic with actions CLA combines the envi-
ronment logic E and the coalition logic for actions A by
adding
1. (hhGii ^ []') ! hhGii',
2. hhGii' !
W
fhhGii^[]'j is the conjunction of a
set of atomic actions or their negationsg.
/
CLA provides us with a formal framework for reasoning
about what states of affairs groups of agents can achieve and
how they can do so. For a detailed discussion of CLA, the
reader is referred to Sauro et al. [14]. Now, we procede by
adding an explicit representation of the agents’ preferences
to CLA.
3. Cooperation Logic with Actions and Prefer-
ences (CLA+P)
In this section, a logic for reasoning about cooperation, ac-
tions and preferences is developed. This is done by adding
a preference logic to CLA. For a more detailed discussion
of what is covered in this section and detailed proofs, see
[8].
3.1. Preference Logic
There are various ways how preferences can be added to a
logic for cooperation and actions. We could for instance
let the preferences of each agent range over the actions that
he can perform. Alternatively, we can think of each agent
having preferences over the set of successor states of the
current state.
In the current work, we consider preferences of single
agents over the states of the environment. This is reason-
able since by performing actions the agents can change the
current state of the environment, and the preferences over
those states can be seen as the base of how the agents de-
cide how to act. Such a preference relation can also be lifted
to one over formulas [15, 16].
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Preference Model [16]] A preference
model is a tuple
MP = hS;Ag;figi2Ag;V i;
where S is a set of states, Ag is a set of agents, for each
i 2 Ag;i S S is a reﬂexive and transitive relation and
V is a propositional valuation. /
As a language, we use a fragment of the basic preference
language developed by van Benthem et al. [15]. It has strict
and non-strict unary preference modalities for each agent.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [PreferenceLanguage]Givenasetofpropo-
sitional variables and a ﬁnite set of agents Ag, deﬁne the
preference language Lp to be the language generated by the
following syntax:
' := p :' ' _ ' 3i' 3i':
/
3i' says that there is a state satisfying ', and agent i
prefers this state over the current one, i.e.
MP;s  3i' iff 9t : s i t and MP;t  ':
3i' is interpreted analogously. The preference relation 
should be reﬂexive and transitive and  should be its largest
irreﬂexive subrelation. Thus, the following axiomatization
is chosen.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Preference Logic P] For a given set of
agents Ag, let P be the logic generated by the following
axioms for each agent i 2 Ag:
For 3i and 3i, we have duality axioms and K. For
3i, we also have reﬂexivity and transitivity axioms. Ad-
ditionally, there are four axioms for the interaction between
the strict and non-strict modalities:
1. 3i' ! 3i',
2. 3i3' ! 3i',
3. 3i3i' ! 3i',
4. ' ^ 3i  ! (3i  _ 3i(  ^ 3i')):
The inference rules are modus ponens, necessitation and
substitution of logical equivalents. /Note that transitivity for 3i follows from the above ax-
ioms. We can show soundness and completeness of the
preference logic. The fact that  is supposed to be the
greatest irreﬂexive subrelation of  can be dealt with by
using the bulldozing technique. For the details, the reader
is referred to van Benthem et al. [15].
Theorem 3.4 P is sound and complete with respect to the
class of preference models.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 3.9 in [15]. QED
3.2. Environment Logic with Preferences
As an intermediate step towards a logic for reasoning about
cooperation, actions and preferences, we ﬁrst combine the
preference logic and the environment logic. The two mod-
els are combined by identifying their sets of states. Then
the preferences of the agents range over the states of the en-
vironment. In such a system, the agents cannot act in the
environment, but they can rather be seen as observers that
observe the environment from the outside and have prefer-
ences over the states.
Deﬁnition 3.5 [Environment with Preferences] An envi-
ronment model with preferences is a tuple
E = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;figi2Ag;V i;
where hS;Ac;(!)AAc;figi2Ag;V i is an environment
model and hS;Ag;figi2Ag;V i is a preference model. /
Wecombinethelanguagesfortheenvironmentandthepref-
erences and add expressions for saying that “every state ac-
cessible by an  transition is (strictly) preferred by agent i
over the current state”.
Convention 3.6 In what follows, we write the symbol C in
statements that hold for both  and , each uniformly sub-
stituted for C.
Deﬁnition 3.7 The language Lep contains all expressions
of the environment language and the preference language
and additionally formulas of the forms []i> and []i>,
for  being an action expression.
Booleancombinationsandexpressionsofthepreviouslyde-
ﬁned languages are interpreted in the standard way. For the
newly introduced expressions, we have:
E;s  []Ci> iff 8A  Ac;t 2 S : if s !A
t and A   then s Ci t:
/
Expressionsoftheform[]Ci>cannotbedeﬁnedusingjust
the preference language and the environment language. To
see this, note that []i> says that for every state accessible
by an -transition it holds that this same state is accessible
by . Thus, we would have to be able to refer to particular
states. Therefore, we add two inference rules for deriving
the newly introduced expressions.
(PREF-ACT)
2
i'![]'
[]i>
(STRICT PREF-ACT)
2
i'![]'
[]i>
In order to obtain a complete axiomatization, two axioms
are added which correspond to the converse of the inference
rules.
Theorem 3.8 Let EP be the logic generated by all axioms
of the environment logic E, all axioms of the preference
logic P, and
1. []i> ! (2i' ! []');
2. []i> ! (2i' ! []'):
The inference rules are modus ponens, substitution of logi-
cal equivalents, PREF-ACT and STRICT PREF-ACT. Then
EP is sound and complete with respect to the class of en-
vironment models with preferences.
Proof. Completeness follows from completeness of the
sublogics and the closure under the new rules. QED
In the environment logic with preferences, the performance
of concurrent actions changes the current state of the system
also with respect to the ‘happiness’ of the agents: A transi-
tion from one state to another can also be a transition up or
down in the preference orderings of the agents.
3.3. Cooperation Logic with Actions and
Preferences
Now, agents are introduced as actors by combining the envi-
ronment models with preferences with agents models. The
resulting model is then called a multi-agent system with
preferences (henceforth MaSP).
Deﬁnition 3.9 [Multi-agent System with Preferences] A
multi-agent system with preferences (MaSP) M is a tu-
ple
M = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;Ag;act;figi2Ag;V i;
where hS;Ac;(!)AAc;V;Ag;acti is a MaS, hS;Ag;fi
gi2Ag;V i is a preference model and hS;Ac;(!)AAc;fi
gi2Ag;V i is an environment with preferences. /InordertogetsomeintuitionsabouthowMaSP’sarerelated
to other models of interaction, note that given a determinis-
tic MaSP in which each preference relation i is total, we
can consider each state s as having a strategic game
Gs = hAg;(P(act(i)))i2Ag;(.i)i2Agi
attached to it, where n
i=1Ai .i n
i=1A0
i iff t i
t0 for s !S
i2Ag Ai t and s !S
i2Ag A0
i t0.
For talking about the cooperative ability of agents with re-
spect to preferences, we introduce two expressions saying
that a group can force the system to move to a '-state that
some agent (strictly) prefers over the current one.
Deﬁnition 3.10 [Language Lcla+p] The language Lcla+p
extends Lcla by formulas of the form
3i' j 3i' j []i> j []i> j hhGiii' j hhGiii':
The ﬁrst four expressions are interpreted as in the environ-
ment logic with preferences and for the last two we have
the following.
M;s  hhGCiii' iff 9A  act(G) such that
8B  act(Ag n G);t 2 S :
if s !A[B t; then M;t 
' and s Ci t.
/
Let us now look at how coalitional power to achieve an im-
provement for an agent is made explicit in CLA+P. We can
show that hhGCiii' is equivalent to the existence of an ac-
tion expression  that G can force and that has the property
that all transitions of type  are guaranteed to lead to a '-
state preferred by agent i.
Observation 3.11 Given a MaSP M and a state s of its
environment,
M;s  hhGCiii' iff there exists an action expres-
sion  such that M;s 
hhGii ^ []' ^ []Ci>.
Proof. Analogous to that of Observation 14
in [14]. For the left-to-right direction, use
the action expression
V
(A;G) :=
V
(A [
f:aja 2 (act(G) n A);a = 2 act(Ag n G)g): QED
Thus, formulas of the form hhGCiii' can be reduced to ex-
pressions of the sublogics. We also need new axioms es-
tablishing a relationship between the newly added formulas
and the expressions of the sublogics.
Deﬁnition 3.12 [Cooperation Logic with Actions and Pref-
erences CLA+P] Deﬁne CLA+P to be the smallest logic
generated by the axioms of the cooperation logic with ac-
tions, the environment logic with preferences and
1. (hhGii ^ []' ^ []Ci>) ! hhGCiii';
2. hhGiii' !
W
fhhGii ^ []' ^ []i>j is a con-
junction of action literalsg;
3. hhGiii' !
W
fhhGii ^ []' ^ []i>j is a con-
junction of action literalsg:
The inference rules are modus ponens, necessitation for
action modalities and preference modalities (2i;2i),
substitution of logical equivalents, PREF   ACT and
STRICT PREF   ACT: /
Soundness of the axioms is straightforward and complete-
ness follows from completeness of the sublogics.
Theorem 3.13 The logic CLA+P is sound and complete
with respect to the class of MaSP’s.
3.4. Expressivity of CLA+P
The framework of CLA+P allows us to reason about coali-
tional power in an explicit way since we can express how
groups of agents can achieve the truth of some formula, and
moreover we can also express how coalitional power and
actions relate to the agents’ preferences.
In game theory, coalitional power has mostly been studied
within coalitional games [11]. One of the most important
solution concepts of coalitional games is the core, which
is the set of outcomes the grand coalition can achieve that
have the property that no coalition can achieve some other
outcome that is strictly better for all its members.
In the framework of CLA+P, we can characterize the
states in a model that have a very similar property: The
formula ^   characterizes the set of states in which no group
has the power of making the system move into a state that
is strictly better for all its members:
^   :=
V
GAg
V
Aact(G)
 W
i2G :[
V
(A;G)]
i >

:
For the deﬁnition of
V
(A;G), see the proof of Observa-
tion 3.11.
In interactive situations, there can be different ways of how
agents can achieve some result. These ways can consist of
different plans that the agents can execute, and whereas all
the actions or plans might lead to the same result ', exe-
cuting one plan might be better for the agents than execut-
ing another one. Being ‘better’ could be in the sense that
one plan leads to an improvement of the situation for more
agents than executing another plan does. In CLA+P, we can
express that a group G can achieve ' in such a way that the
situation improves for all its members:W
Aact(G)

([
V
(A;G)]') ^
V
i2G [
V
(A;G)]
i >

:
Thus, the explicit representation of actions and preferences
allows us to reason about how exactly a group would choose
to achieve some result, assuming that the members make
their decisions according to a certain solution concept.
Alternatively, executing one plan might be better than
another one in the sense that it is cheaper. By having
both actions and preferences in our framework, we can also
express how actions and preferences interact and thereby
our framework can also give rise to a formal model for
cost-beneﬁt analysis. In cost-beneﬁt-analysis, decisions are
made by comparing the expected cost of executing actions
and the expected beneﬁt.
4. Complexity of CLA+P
In this section, we investigate the complexity of the satisﬁa-
bility problem of CLA+P. Let us start by trying to determine
an upper bound.
4.1. Upper Bound for CLA+P
In order to establish an upper bound, it has to be shown that
computing whether some formula is satisﬁable can be done
using a certain amount of time or space. The ﬁrst step is to
show that only a restricted class of models of CLA+P needs
to be checked.
For a formula ', let Ag(') denote the set of agents oc-
curring in '. Now, we ask: Is any satisﬁable formula '
also satisﬁable in a MaSP whose set of agents is Ag(')?
In Coalition Logic, the answer is negative due to formulas
such as
'0 = :hhf1giip ^ :hhf1giiq ^ hhf1gii(p _ q);
which can only be satisﬁed in coalition models with at least
two agents [13]. However, as in CLA+P the underlying en-
vironment models can be nondeterministic, here '0 can in-
deed be satisﬁed in a model with only one agent, as the
reader can check.
It can be shown that every satisﬁable formula ' 2
Lcla+p is satisﬁable in a MaSP with set of agents Ag(') [
fkg, for k being a newly introduced agent. k takes the
role of all opponents of Ag(') collapsed into one. This
means that k gets the ability to perform exactly the ac-
tions that agents not occurring in ' can perform as a group.
Whentransformingamodelsatisfying'intoonewithsetof
agents Ag(') [ fkg, we do not need to change the effects
of actions or the abilities of agents in Ag('). This is the
main fact that makes the proof of Theorem 4.1 go through.
Moreover, note that the preferences of agent k do not have
any inﬂuence on the truth of ' since k does not occur in '.
Theorem 4.1 Every satisﬁable formula ' 2 Lcla+p is sat-
isﬁable in the class of MaSP’s with at most jAg(')j + 1
many agents.
Proof. Assume that M = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;Ag;act;fi
gi2Ag;V i satisﬁes '. If Ag  Ag('), we con-
struct M0
0
= hS;Ac;(!)AAc;Ag(') [ fkg;act0;f0
i
gi2Ag(')[fkg;V i, with act0(k) =
S
j2AgnAg(') act(j) and
act0(i) = act(i) for i 6= k. The preferences are deﬁned as
follows: 0
i=i for i 2 Ag(') and 0
k= S  S: By induc-
tion, it can be shown that M;s  ' iff M0
0
;s  '. The
interesting case is the one where ' is of the form hhGii.
Here, the claim follows from the deﬁnition of act0. The
other cases involving coalition modalities follow. QED
Next, we would like to know how many actions a model
needs in order to satisfy some formula. As an example,
consider the formula
'0 = hhGii(p ^ q) ^ hhGii(:p ^ q) ^ hhGii(:p ^ :q):
It can only be satisﬁed in models with jAcj  2: The main
task is to ﬁnd “witnesses” for formulas of the form hhGii 
in terms of concurrent actions that tell us how exactly G
can achieve  . We can show that every satisﬁable formula
' can be satisﬁed in a MaSP whose set of actions consists of
the actions occurring in ', one additional atomic action, and
for every subformula of the forms hhGii  or hhGCiii , one
atomic action for each of G’s members. The one additional
action is a dummy that serves for making sure that every
agent can perform some action.
The key step in transforming a model satisfying a for-
mula ' into one whose set of actions satisﬁes the above
condition is to deﬁne the action distribution and the acces-
sibility relations in an appropriate way. For every action ex-
pression  occuring in ', we have to ensure that two states
are accessible by an -transition in the new model iff they
were in the original one. Additionally, for any formula of
the forms hhGii  or hhGCiii , the set of actions that we in-
troduced for that formula serves for making explicit how G
can force '. Note that we do not need to introduce any addi-
tional actions for making explicit how a group can force an
action expression . This results from the fact that in order
to force , agents only need to perform actions that already
occur in .
Theorem 4.2 Every satisﬁabe formula ' 2 Lcla+p
is satisﬁable in a MaSP with at most jAc(')j +
(
P
hhGii 2Sub(') jGj) + (
P
hhGiii 2Sub(') jGj) +
(
P
hhGiii 2Sub(') jGj) + 1 many actions.
Proof. Assume that M = hS;Ac;(!)AAc;Ag;act;fi
gi2Ag;V i satisﬁes '. We construct a model M0
0
=
hS;Ac0;(!0)A0Ac0;Ag;act0;f0
igi2Ag;V i as follows.Ac0 := Ac(') [
S
hhGii 2Sub(') AG 
[
S
hhGiii 2Sub(') AGi  [ S
hhGiii 2Sub(') AGi  [f^ ag:
AG  and AGCi  consist of newly introduced actions aG j,
and aGCi j respectively, for each j 2 G. Action abilities
are distributed as follows:
act0(i) := (act(i) \ Ac(')) [ f^ ag [ faGijhhGii  2
Sub(') or hhGCiii  2 Sub('); for i 2
Gg:
For deﬁning the accessibility relation !A0Ac0, we ﬁrst
deﬁne for any state s its set of successors.
t 2 Ts
A0 iff 1. 8[]  2 Sub(') such that A0   :
If M;s  [] ; then M;t   ,
2. 8[]Ci> 2 Sub(') such that A0 
 : If M;s  []Ci>; then s Ci t,
3. 8hhGii  2 Sub(') such that A0  V
(AG ;G), there is some  A 
act(G) such that s !A t for some
A  Ac such that A 
V
(  A;G),
and if M;s  hhGii  then
M;s  [
V
(  A;G)] ,
4. 8hhGCiii  2 Sub(') such that
A0 
V
(AGCi ;G), there is
some  A  act(G) such that
s !A t for some A  Ac such
that A 
V
(  A;G), and if
M;s  hhGCiii  then M;s 
[
V
(  A;G)]  and M;s 
[
V
(  A;G)]Ci>g.
For any t 2 Ts
A0; we set s !0
A0 t.
Then we can show by induction on   2 Sub(') that
M;s    iff M0
0
;s   . QED
The next step is to show that every satisﬁable formula ' is
also satisﬁable in a model with a certain number of states.
Such results are usually obtained by transforming a model
into a smaller one using a transformation that preserves
the truth of subformulas of '. Here, the irreﬂexivity of the
strict preferences is causing problems and thus we restrict
our investigations to formulas that do not involve strict
preferences. We denote this fragment of Lcla+p by L

cla+p
and the corresponding fragment of CLA+P by CLA+P
.
Using the method of ﬁltration [5], we show that any sat-
isﬁable formula ' 2 L

cla+p is satisﬁable in a model with
exponentially many states. Note that formulas of the form
hhGii  and hhGiii  correspond to formulas of the form W
Aact(G)[
V
(A;G)]  and
W
Aact(G)([
V
(A;G)]  ^
[
V
(A;G)]i>), respectively – for
V
(A;G) as in the
proof of Observation 3.11. During the ﬁltration, the under-
lying agents model is not changed and therefore the truth of
formulas of the form hhGii is preserved.
Theorem 4.3 Every satisﬁable ' 2 L

cla+p is also satisﬁ-
able in a MaSP with  2j'j many states.
Proof. Given that M;s  ' for some M = hS;Ac;(!
)AAc;Ag;act;figi2Ag;V i, s 2 S, we obtain
Mf
f
= hS;Ac;(!f)AAc;Ag;actf;f
f
i gi2Ag;V fi
by ﬁltrating M through Sub('), where the accessibility
relations for actions and preferences are deﬁned as follows:
jsj !
f
A jtj iff 1. 8[]  2 Sub(') such that A 
 : if M;s  [] , then
M;t   ,
2. 8[]i> 2 Sub(') such that A 
 : if M;s  []i>, then s i
t,
3. 8hhGii  2 Sub(') such that
A 
V
(A0;G) for some
A0  act(G) : if M;s 
[
V
(A0;G)] ; then M;t   ;
4. 8hhGiii  2 Sub(') such that
A 
V
(A0;G) for some
A0  act(G): if M;s 
[
V
(A0;G)]  and M;s 
[
V
(A0;G)]i>, then M;t 
  and s i t.
jsj 
f
i jtj iff 1. 83i  2 Sub('): if M;t   _
3i  then M;s  3i ,
2. If there is some []i> 2 Sub(');
then s i t;
3. If there is some hhGiii  2
Sub('), then s i t:
V f(p) := fjsjjM;s  pg, for all propositional letters p 2
Sub('). We show by induction that for all   2 Sub(')
and s 2 S it holds that M;s    iff M
f
;jsj   : This
follows from the deﬁnitions of (!f)AAc and f, and the
fact that the ﬁltration does not change the underlying agents
model.
By deﬁnition of SSub('), jSSub(')j  2j'j. QED
Applying the constructions in the proofs of Theorems 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3 successively, we obtain the following:
Corollary 4.4 Every satisﬁable formula ' 2 L

cla+p is sat-
isﬁable in a MaSP of size exponential in j'j satisfying theconditions jAgj  jAg(')j + 1 and jAcj  jAc(')j + P
hhGii 2Sub(') jGj + (
P
hhGiii 2Sub(') jGj) + 1:
Having non-deterministicly guessed a model of size ex-
ponential in j'j, we can check in time exponential in j'j
whether this model satisﬁes '. This then gives us a NExp-
Time upper bound.
Theorem 4.5 The satisﬁability problem of CLA+P
 is in
NExpTime.
Proof. Given ', we non-deterministically choose a
model M of size exponential in j'j satisfying the con-
ditions jAgj  jAg(')j + 1 and jAcj  jAc(')j + P
hhGii 2Sub(') jGj + (
P
hhGiii 2Sub(') jGj) + 1: Then,
given this model, we can check in time O(j'jjjMjj), for
jjMjj being the size of M, whether M satisﬁes '.
Thus, given a model of size exponential in j'j that also sat-
isﬁes the conditions on its sets of agents and actions ex-
plained earlier, it can be computed in time exponential in
j'j whether it satisﬁes '. Since it can be checked in time
linear in the size of the model whether it is a proper MaSP,
we conclude that the satisﬁability problem of CLA+P
 is
in NExpTime. QED
This section has shown that the satisﬁability problem of
CLA+P
 is in NExpTime. As the reader might expect, it
has however a rather high computational complexity caused
by the environment logic. The next section shows that the
satisﬁability problem of the environment logic is already
NExpTime-hard and therefore adding agents as actors and
preferences does not increase the complexity signiﬁcantly.
4.2. Lower Bound
Establishing a NExpTime lower bound for the satisﬁability
problem of CLA+P can be done by reducing that of the
Boolean modal logic K:[
m [10] to it, which is known to be
NExpTime-complete [9].
Models of K:[
m have a set of accesibility relations
R1;:::;Rm and the associated language L:[
m that is used
for talking about the models contains corresponding basic
modal parameters R1;:::;Rm. Using the operations :
and [, more complex modal parameters can be built. The
modalities then run along the corresponding sets of accessi-
bility relations in the models.
Then a model M of K:[
m with set of states W can be
translated into an environment model 1(M) with set of
states W [ fug for some newly introduced state u and set
of actions Ac = fa1;:::;amg. The accessibility relation
(!)AAc is deﬁned as
w !A w0 iff A = faij(w;w0) 2 Rig or w0 = u:
Thus, u is accessible from everywhere by any transition
!A. This ensures that each !A is serial. Formulas ' 2
L:[
m can be translated into 2(') 2 Le in a straightfor-
ward way: Inside the modalities, modal parameters Ri are
translated into atomic actions ai and complex parameters
are translated into action expressions (: and [ correspond
to : and _ respectively).
Theorem 4.6 For any formula ' 2 L:[
m and any model M
of K:[
m , for any state w in M:
M;w  ' iff 1(M);w  2('):
The reduction is polynomial and hence the satisﬁability
problems of CLA+P
 and CLA+P are NExpTime-hard.
Corollary 4.7 The satisﬁability problem of CLA+P
 is
NExpTime-complete.
This section has shown that the satisﬁability problem of
CLA+P without strict preferences is NExpTime-complete.
This rather high complexity is due to the environment logic
which itself is already NExpTime-complete. Adding agents
withnonstrictpreferencesasactorstotheenvironmentlogic
does not increase the complexity signiﬁcantly. Due to the
undeﬁnability of irreﬂexivity extending the complexity re-
sults of CLA+P
 to full CLA+P cannot be done using stan-
dard techniques such as ﬁltration as we did in Theorem 4.3.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a modular modal logic that allows for
reasoning about the coalitional power of agents, actions and
their effects, and agents’ preferences. The current approach
is based on the logic CLA [14] which is combined with
a preference logic [15, 16]. The resulting logic CLA+P,
which is shown to be sound and complete, allows us to
make explicit how groups of agents can achieve certain
results. Additionally, we can express how a group can
achieve that a transition takes place that is an improvement
for some agent. In the framework of CLA+P, it can be
expressed how the abilities to perform certain actions are
distributed among the agents, what are the effects of the
concurrent performance of these actions and what are
the agents’ preferences over those effects. Moreover, in
CLA+P, we can distinguish between different ways how
groups can achieve some result – not only with respect to
the actions that lead to some result, but also with respect
to the preferences. We can for instance express that a
group can achieve some result in a way that is ‘good’ for
its members in the sense that after the achievement all of
them are better off. Thus, CLA+P provides a framework
for reasoning about interactive situations in an explicit way
that gives us more insights into the cooperative abilities ofagents.
The satisﬁability problem of CLA+P without strict pref-
erences is shown to be NExpTime-complete. It remains
to be investigated whether the same holds for CLA+P.
From a computational viewpoint, it seems to be appealing
to change the environment logic in order to decrease
computational complexity.
There are two immediate ways to extend the logic devel-
oped in this paper. First of all, we can follow the ideas of
˚ Agotnes et al. [3] and add a restricted form of quantiﬁca-
tionthatallowsstatementsoftheformhhPiii  sayingthat
there is some group G that has property P and hhGiii .
Moreover, it might be promising to develop a coopera-
tion logic with actions and preferences based on a logic for
reasoning about complex plans such as the the one devel-
oped by Gerbrandy and Sauro [7].
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